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Economic Policies to Address  
The Environmental Consequences of Global Reuse 
By THOMAS KINNAMAN AND HIDE-FUMI YOKOO*
The international trade of used consumer 
electronics, a concept we call global reuse, has 
been growing rapidly over the past decade.  
Japan, for example, has increased its exports of 
used personal computers from just 0.18 million 
units in 2001 to 1.42 million units in 2008 
(PC3R Promotion Center, 2010).  Japan also 
exported 2.25 million used television sets in 
2008 (Aya Yoshida and Atsushi Terazono, 
2010) and the United States exported 10.2 
million used personal computers in 2002.  Most 
of these exports go to developing countries. 
Used electronic goods exported to 
developing countries become electronic wastes 
(e-wastes) that are usually disassembled in 
those developing countries.  E-waste is often 
comprised of toxic substances such as lead, 
mercury, cadmium, and flame retardants.  
Because e-waste disposal and disassembly 
practices vary widely between developed and 
developing countries, exporting used personal 
electronics may have consequences on both 
human health and the global environment. 
This paper presents a model to solve for 
economically efficient tax and subsidy rates in 
an economy with international trade in used 
consumer electronics.  The two-country model 
considers disposal taxes levied in both the 
developed and developing country, an import 
tax on used consumer electronics, and a 
subsidy paid for the return of the e-waste to 
developed countries for disassembly. 
I. Disassembling Practices 
E-waste in developing countries is 
dismantled by individuals and small businesses 
using labor intensive methods in order to 
collect embedded precious metals (Alejandra 
Sepúlveda, Mathias Schluep, Fabrice Renaud, 
Martin Streicher, Ruediger Kuehr, Christian 
Hagelüken and Andreas C. Gerecke, 2010).  
This dismantling process, which can include 
open burning of circuit boards, cables, and 
plastics, and the manual dismantling of cathode 
ray tubes, involves the release of toxic 
substances.  For example, ambient dioxin and 
furan concentrations in the air around an e-
waste dismantling site in China are the highest 
in the world (Huiru Li, Liping Yu, Guoying 
Sheng, Jiamo Fu, and Ping’an Peng, 2007).  As 
a result, blood lead levels in children within 
proximity to this Chinese dismantling site 
significantly exceed the Chinese mean.  
Concentrations of lead, dioxins and furans in e-
waste dismantling sites in India also exceed 
World Health Organization guidelines 
(Sepúlveda et al., 2010). 
High labor costs and labor safety standards 
in many developed countries make labor 
intensive methods of dismantling e-waste 
uneconomical.  Instead, used consumer 
electronics are first shredded and then magnets 
and blowers separate the precious metals from 
the various plastics.  The metals are then sent to 
a smelter and the plastics to a recycler.  Threats 
to human health and environment are reduced 
relative to those associated with labor-intensive 
methods in developing countries.  E-waste in 
the United States is also disposed into landfills.   
But most e-waste collected in the United 
States (roughly 80%) is exported to developing 
countries for reuse or for human dismantling1.  
Economic policy instruments may be partly 
responsible for the export of used electronics.  
Japan implemented in 2003 a producer 
responsibility measure that requires 
manufactures to send consumers shipping 
                                                        
1
 In 2005, the U.S. discarded 1.36-1.72 million metric tons 
of e-waste in landfills.  Only 0.31-0.34 million metric tons 
were dismantled domestically.  E-waste accounts for 70% 
of the heavy metals in U.S. landfills (U.S. EPA, 2007). 
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 labels for sending used personal computers to 
nearby reclaiming locations (consumers pay the 
yen equivalent of a $35 fee).  One half to three 
quarters of all personal computers sold in Japan 
are returned in this fashion, but these 
reclaiming facilities often export used personal 
computers to developing countries (Aya 
Yoshida, Tomohiro Tasaki, and Atsushi 
Terazono, 2009).  In the United States, twenty 
four states either ban the disposal of e-waste in 
landfills or require manufacturers to subsidize 
the “recycling” process.  The states of 
California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, South 
Carolina and New Jersey require residents to 
pay an advanced recycling fee of between 
US$6 and US$10 for each new TV or PC 
purchased2.  These policies represent an 
implicit tax on the domestic disposal of e-waste 
in developing countries.  This paper examines 
whether such taxes are consistent with global 
economic efficiency. 
II. The Theory of Global Reuse 
Within the economics literature, only 
Takayoshi Shinkuma (2009) has modeled the 
international trade in used personal electronics 
and argues that producer responsibility 
measures such as those implemented in Japan 
are inefficient.  Brian Copeland (1991) 
examines the international trade in solid waste 
and argues for the elimination of such trade if 
waste receiving countries lack waste disposal 
policies.  Other papers consider the unilateral 
strategic use of waste taxes to improve 
domestic importing and exporting industries.  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo (2010) theoretically 
analyzes whether the reuse of consumer 
electronics decreases e-waste. 
This paper extends upon the work of 
Shinkuma (2009) and Copeland (1991) by 
evaluating incentive-based policy alternatives 
to internalize the social costs associated with 
exporting consumer electronics.  A model is 
developed to structure the tax and subsidy 
policies available to internalize the disposal 
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 See Hai-Yong Kang and Julie M. Schoenung (2005) and 
Ramzy Kahhat, Junbeum Kim, Ming Xu, Braden Allenby, 
Eric Williams and Peng Zhang (2008) for details of U.S. e-
waste management policies. 
costs of used durable goods.3  The model 
consists of a wealthy developed country 
(Country A) and a less wealthy developing 
country (Country B).  A representative 
consumer in Country A derives utility from the 
consumption of durable good such as a 
personal computer.  After consumption, the 
durable good is either disposed or disassembled 
in Country A or exported as a used durable 
good to Country B for additional consumption.  
The representative consumer in Country B 
derives utility from the used durable good and a 
locally produced non-durable good such as an 
agricultural product, a local service, or leisure.  
The disposal of this non-durable good is 
assumed to generate no hazardous e-waste.  All 
used durable goods imported to Country B 
must also be disassembled in Country B (we 
allow later for the possible return of e-waste 
from the used durable good for processing in 
Country A).  The representative consumer in 
both Country A and B gain disutility from the 
aggregate quantity of e-waste disposed or 
disassembled in their own country.  In the 
absence of tax policies, this loss in utility is not 
internalized by agents in the economy – a 
source of market failure. 
The economies in both countries utilize a 
single economic resource such as capital, labor, 
or energy for five production and transportation 
activities.  This resource can be allocated to (1) 
produce the consumer electronic in Country A, 
(2) disassemble e-waste in Country A, (3) 
transport the used consumer electronic to 
Country B, (4) disassemble e-waste from the 
imported consumer electronic in Country B, 
and (5) produce the non-durable good in 
Country B.  The global supply of the economic 
resource is constant. 
The Pareto Optimum is found by allocating 
the economic resource to maximize the utility 
of the representative consumer in Country A 
subject to holding constant the utility of the 
representative consumer in Country B, subject 
to the 5 production technologies defined above, 
subject to the assumed constant supply of the 
economic resource, and subject to the materials 
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 See Hide-Fumi Yokoo and Thomas Kinnaman (2010) for 
a thorough presentation of this model. 
balance constraints governing the flow of the 
used durable good. 
Having characterized the Pareto Optimum, 
the model next solves for rates of various taxes 
necessary for the decentralized competitive 
economy to achieve the Pareto Optimum.  
Three tax instruments are available to this 
economy – a tax on e-waste in Country A, a tax 
on e-waste in Country B, and a tax on the 
import of the used durable good to Country B. 
The representative consumer in Country A 
maximizes utility by allocating their income 
between purchasing the used durable good and 
paying to disassemble the e-waste.  The 
consumer can also earn income from exporting 
and selling the used durable good to the 
representative consumer in Country B, but must 
pay a competitive firm to export the used 
durable good to Country B.  The representative 
consumer in Country B maximizes utility by 
allocating income to purchase the (taxed) 
imported used durable good, to purchase the 
local non-durable good¸ and to pay to 
disassemble e-waste from used durables.   
Representative competitive firms from each 
of the five industries defined above each 
employ the economic resource and a 
production technology to maximize profit.  In 
Country A, one representative firm chooses the 
quantity of the durable good to produce, a 
second chooses the quantity of e-waste to 
disassemble (and pays a disposal tax), and a 
third chooses the quantity of the used durable 
good to export to the representative consumer 
in Country B.  In Country B, one firm chooses 
the quantity of the non-durable good to 
produce¸ and a second chooses the quantity of 
e-waste to disassemble and potentially pays a 
disposal tax on each unit disassembled. 
Given the assumptions of this model, the 
Pareto Optimum can be achieved by utility and 
profit maximizing agents with several intuitive 
combinations of these three tax instruments, 
which are summarized in Table 1. 
 
In the first scenario, both countries are able 
to assess a tax on their own domestic e-waste 
and set the e-waste tax equal to their own 
external marginal cost of e-waste (defined as 
EMCA and EMCB).  The import tax is not 
necessary.  In the second scenario, Country B is 
unable to tax e-waste.  Perhaps the economy 
lacks the necessary technology (such as scales 
for weighing e-waste hauling trucks as they 
enter and exit a disposal site) or the 
government lacks administrative resources to 
discourage illegal dumping that might arise 
with the implementation of an e-waste tax.  The 
Pareto Optimum can be recovered in this 
economy by implementing an import tax set 
equal to the external marginal cost in County B.  
Either the import tax or the e-waste tax results 
in the representative consumer in Country B 
internalizing the social costs of their e-waste.  
The efficiency of the import tax relies heavily 
on the assumption that no other disposal or 
recycling methods are available to the 
consumer in Country B.  If the consumer has 
more than one disposal option, and those 
options involve different external costs, then an 
“upstream” tax such as the import tax does not 
encourage consumers to efficiently choose 
among those options. 
TABLE 1 
 
In the third scenario, we assume no policy 
instrument is available to Country B.  Mexico, 
for example, eliminated trade restrictions on all 
10-15 year-old vehicles in 2005 in accordance 
with NAFTA.  The only remaining tax 
instrument to this economy is the e-waste tax in 
Country A.  The Pareto Optimum can still be 
achieved by setting this tax equal to the 
difference between the marginal cost of 
disposal in Country A and that of Country B.  If 
willingness to pay for environmental quality is 
higher in Country A than in Country B, perhaps 
owing to higher income levels, then the e-waste 
tax in Country A remains positive but will be 
set at a level below the external marginal cost 
in Country A.  If instead external costs of 
disposal are higher in B than in A, perhaps 
owing to primitive open dumping practices that 
threaten human health, then e-waste disposal 
should be subsidized in Country A.  This 
Scenario Country A E-waste Tax  
Country B 
E-waste Tax  
Country B 
Import Tax  
1 EMCA EMCB Zero 
2 EMCA Zero EMCB 
3 EMCA-EMCB Zero Zero 
 subsidy will discourage exports to Country B.   
Examining the three tax scenarios in Table 1 
suggests that the difference in e-waste taxes 
matters for efficiency, not their levels.  
Although differences in e-waste tax across 
countries almost certainly matter to the 
efficient flow of e-waste resources, simplifying 
assumptions in the model might overstate the 
flexibility among scenarios 1, 2, and 3.  Such 
perfect flexibility would likely disappear in a 
model comprised of more than two countries or 
with alternative disposal options (such as 
recycling) in Country B.  We also note that the 
e-waste tax does not induce a substitution effect 
in Country A. 
III. A Return Economy 
Consider a similar economy where a 
technology is available to return e-waste from 
the used durable good back to Country A for 
disposal.  This process requires the global 
economic resource as the sole input – bringing 
to six the number of industries utilizing the 
economic resource.  For reasons articulated 
above, assume the import tax and Country B e-
waste tax are not available.  The remaining 
policy options are the e-waste tax in Country A 
and a subsidy on the return of e-waste to 
Country A.  The return subsidy can be 
administered by the government in Country B, 
a benevolent government in Country A, or by 
the original producers of the durable good as 
part of a producer responsibility policy. 
Once again, differences in tax rates are 
important to achieving the Pareto Optimum 
rather than tax levels.  Four such policy 
scenarios are summarized in Table 2. 
To represent the various policy scenarios 
generated by the model, the external marginal 
cost in Country A (originally EMCA) is 
separated into that from the aggregate e-waste 
generated by consumers in Country A 
(EMCAA) and the that from the aggregate 
returned e-waste generated from consumers in 
Country B (EMCBA).  The e-waste from these 
two sources is identical from the consumer’s 
viewpoint, but the quantities may differ.  If 
consumers in Country A disassemble 
domestically more e-waste than they export to 
Country B for reuse, then EMCAA > EMCBA for 
the simple reason that there will be less e-waste 
material returned to Country A than was 
originally disassembled in Country A.  EMCBA 
will exceed EMCAA only if the amount returned 
to Country A exceeds the amount originally 
disassembled in Country A.  The external 
marginal cost of e-waste disassembled in 
Country B continues to be defined as EMCB. 
TABLE 2 
 
In Scenario 1, the Pareto Optimum can be 
obtained by combining an e-waste subsidy in 
County A with a return tax in Country B.  The 
subsidy in Country A must equal the external 
marginal cost of disposal in County B.  
Consumers in Country A therefore internalize 
the social costs of exporting the used durable 
good to Country B.   The return subsidy is also 
negative, a tax on the return of e-waste to 
Country A.  This tax is set equal to the external 
marginal cost of the returned e-waste for 
disassembly in Country A. 
Although theoretical efficient, neither of 
these two policies in Scenario one would be 
popular within each country.  Considers the 
second scenario where Country A acts 
unilaterally by setting its e-waste tax equal to 
the external marginal cost of e-waste in 
Country A (EMCA).  The global Pareto 
Optimum can be achieved if Country B were to 
set its return subsidy equal to external marginal 
cost of e-waste disassembled in Country B 
(EMCB – to internalize domestic social costs 
for consumers in Country B) plus the external 
marginal cost in Country A (EMCAA – to 
neutralize the positive e-waste tax in Country 
A) minus the external marginal cost of 
disassembling returned e-waste in Country A 
(EMCBA – to internalize international social 
costs for consumers in Country B).  In the 
event that EMCAA > EMCBA, the return subsidy 
Scenario Country A E-Waste Tax 
Country B 
Return Subsidy 
1 - (EMCB) - (EMCBA) 
2 EMCAA EMCB+EMCAA - EMCBA 
3 EMCBA EMCB 
4 EMCBA - EMCB Zero 
will be greater than the external marginal cost 
of disassembly in Country B. 
Country B acts unilaterally in Scenario 3 by 
setting the return subsidy equal to the external 
marginal cost of e-waste in Country B such that 
their consumers internalize domestic social e-
waste disassembly costs.  The Pareto Optimum 
can only be achieved if Country A sets their e-
waste tax equal to the external marginal cost of 
disposing Country B’s returned e-waste in 
Country A (EMCBA), a rate that may be below 
the unilateral tax rate in Country A if the 
quantity returned from Country B is exceeded 
by the quantity originally disassembled In 
Country A.   
If both countries act unilaterally, the 
resulting tax and subsidy rates will achieve the 
Pareto Optimum only in the rare case that 
EMCAA = EMCBA (the quantity of original e-
waste disassembled in Country A is equal to 
the quantity returned from Country B).  This 
condition is also met when e-waste disassembly 
in Country A generates no external costs 
(EMCAA = EMCBA = 0).  External disassembly 
costs are zero if environmental policies in 
developed countries result in disassembly 
plants internalizing all social costs of the 
disassembly process. 
In the fourth scenario assume that lacking 
administrative resources, the return of e-waste 
to Country A cannot be subsidized.  The only 
available policy instrument is the e-waste tax in 
Country A.  The global Pareto optimum can be 
achieved by reducing the e-waste tax in 
Country A to an amount equal to the external 
marginal cost of disassembling the returned e-
waste (such that consumers in County B 
internalize social disposal costs in Country A) 
less the external marginal cost of disposal cost 
in Country B (such that consumers in Country 
A internalize social disposal costs in Country 
B).  The optimal e-waste tax could be positive 
or negative depending upon the magnitudes of 
these two externalities.  Country A would 
subsidize domestic e-waste disposal if the 
external cost of disposal in Country B exceeds 
the external cost of returning the e-waste to 
Country A. 
If the e-waste tax in Country A is the only 
available policy instrument, then by comparing 
the Scenario 3 e-waste tax rate in the simple 
economy with the Scenario 4 e-waste tax from 
the return economy suggests the emergence of 
the return technology serves to change the e-
waste tax in County A by an amount equal to 
the difference between EMCAA and EMCBA.  If 
EMCAA > EMCBA, then the e-waste tax 
decreases with the emergence of the return 
technology. 
Finally, the results of the model provide 
efficiency conditions for an economy void of e-
waste policy instruments.  A policy regime of 
no e-waste taxes or subsidies in either country 
will achieve the Pareto Optimum if external 
disposal costs are equal across Countries A and 
B (EMCBA = EMCB).  Willingness to pay for 
environmental quality is likely higher in 
developed Country A than in Country B, but 
exposures to toxins from labor-intensive 
disassembly processes in Country B are likely 
higher than for mechanized processes in 
Country A.  Combine these two effects, and the 
two external costs may not be far apart. 
The current policy environment features 
implicit e-waste taxes in many developed 
countries such as Japan and the United States.  
These implicit e-waste taxes derive from 
policies that ban e-waste from landfills in 
developed countries and producer 
responsibility measures that subsidize the 
return of used consumer electronics for 
“recycling,” which usually involves exporting 
the goods for disassembly in developing 
countries.  Developing countries impose no 
known taxes on e-waste disassembly or any 
import tariffs on used durable goods.  This 
policy environment is likely inefficient if the 
implicit e-waste taxes in developed countries 
do not consider external disassembly costs in 
developing countries as is called for in the final 
scenario of each economy modeled above 
(Tables 1 and 2). 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has provided a broad blueprint of 
what international policy could look like to 
manage the negative externality associated with 
global reuse – the potential ill health effects of 
employing labor-intensive dismantling of 
 electronic waste.  If e-waste taxes or import 
taxes are available in the developing country, 
then setting these instruments equal to the 
marginal external costs of disassembly are 
warranted.  Subsidy the return of e-waste 
following the reuse of the consumer electronics 
can also have lead to economic efficiency.  But 
in the absence of these policy options, the 
implicit e-waste disposal taxes in many 
developed countries should be lowered to rates 
below external marginal costs in developed 
countries to achieve global economic 
efficiency. 
The model also suggests that optimal 
policies change only slightly when considering 
the trade in used consumer electronics relative 
to unusable e-waste.  Optimal policy rates 
displayed in Tables 1 and 2 are about the same. 
Finally, the model has a few weaknesses that 
could be addressed in future research.  First, the 
economic resource used to produce consumer 
electronics and transport and disassemble e-
waste is free to flow between the developed 
and developing country.  A more realistic 
model would place constraints on this flow or 
assume each country has a domestic economic 
resource.  Second, the model assumes only one 
disassembly process (a labor intensive one) in 
Country B.  If other processes are available, 
and if those processes vary with respect to 
external costs, then some of the policy options 
discussed in this paper are no longer efficient.  
Finally, consumers in Country A gain utility 
only from electronics.  The lack of a second 
good prevents a substitution effect if e-waste 
taxes increase.  If developing countries are 
unable to implement e-waste policies, then 
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